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Abstract
With
self-propagating worms continue to pose
pose a serious threat
With increasing speed, virulence,
virulence, and sophistication, selfpropagating
to
self-propagating worms, a critical
critical task is to
of the Internet. To
To effectively ident(fy
identify and defend against selfpropagating
to the
the safety of
well-established dimension for
for
characterize a worm
worm. along multiple dimensions. Content-based fingerprinting is a well-established
worm
worm characterization by deriving the most representative content sequence as a worm's signature. However, this
dimension
dimension alone does not capture all aspects of
of a worm and may therefore lead to incomplete or inaccurate worm
characterization.
To
paper proposes
proposes and just$es
justifies a new dimensiorz,
dimension, behavioral
behavioral
To expand the space of
of worm characterization, this paper
footprinting.
behavioral footprinting
footprinting characterizes
characterizes
footprinting. Orthogonal and complementary to content-based fingerprinting, behavioral
a worm's unique behavior during each infection session.,
session, which covers the probing, exploitation,
exploitation, and
and replication
phases of
and the entire infection
of the
the infection
infection session.
session. By modeling each infection step as a behavior phenotype and
footprinting captures worn-specific
worm.-specijic behavior
session as
as a sequential behavioral footprint, we show that behavioral footprinting
present advanced
advanced sequence analysis
which
different from a normal access to the vulnerable service. We
We present
which is
is inherently differentfrom
of realtechniques
footprint from its infection traces. Our evaluation with a number of
techniques to
to extract a worm's behavioral footprint
successfully extracting worm-characterizing
world worms clearly demonstrates its feasibility
feasibility and effectiveness in successfilly
content-based jingerprinting,
fingerprinting,
behavioral footprints for all experimented worms. Furthermore, by comparing with content-based
our experiments
of behavioral
behavioral footprinting
footprinting in worm recognition and
and
e.xperiments demonstrate the uniqueness and robustness of
identification.
identification.
Keywords: Worm
Worm Recognition and Characterization, Behavioral Footprinting, Content-Based Fingerprinting
Keywords:

11 Introduction
Introduction
Self-propagating worms continue to pose a serious threat to the safety of the Internet, To effectively identify
identify and
defend against self-propagating worms, a critical task is to characterize a worm along multiple dimensions. Content[26, 28,
28, 33,
33, 43]
431 is a well-established
well-established dimension to capture a worm's
worm's characteristics by deriving
based fingerprinting [26,
signature. In practice, various intrusion detection systems
the most representative content sequence as the worm's signature.
(IDSes) [36,
[36, 41],
411, together with recent honeypot systems [5,
[5, 22, 38,461,
(lOSes)
38,46], are deployed to collect live worms. Once a
specimen1
is collected, anti-worm experts will manually examine the specimen and extract a worm-identifying
I is
worm specimen
[26, 28, 33,
431 take one step further by automatically
as the worm's signature.
signature. Recent systems [26,
33,43]
content fingerprint as
fingerprints. These systems have demonstrated a degree of
of success. However, they all
generating worms' content fingerprints.
'The worm specimen might
mieht not only contain the worm binary itself,
itself. but also include other corresponding traffic associated
IThe
associated with
with a worm
worm
(e.g., exploitation).
exploitation).
infection (e.g.,
infection

focus
focus on one dimension
dimension of worm characterization, namely content, while missing other aspects of a worm. This
single-dimension characterization may limit the capability of worm identification
identification and recognition. For example,
example, it has

been demonstrated that advanced worms are now capable of exploiting the weakness of content-based fingerprinting
fingerprinting
[45] or encrypting [27]
[27] their contents or payloads in each infection
infection session, hence escaping recognition
by mutating [45]
and identification
identification by content fingerprints.
fingerprints.
We are motivated to explore other dimensions to expand the space of worm characterization and thus enhance worm
identification
identification capabilities. Especially,
Especially, we realize that content-based fingerprinting
fingerprinting does not capture a worm's temporal
infection
behavior, which contains valuable
infection behavior,
valuable self-identifying information that leads to the worm's recognition.
recognition. In this

jootprinting, to enrich worm characterization. We would
paper, we present and justify a new dimension,
dimension, behavioral footprinting,
like to emphasize that behavioral
behavioral footprinting is expected to be orthogonal and complementary to other dimensions
including content fingerprinting.
fingerprinting. This new dimension alone also suffers from
from ineffectiveness
ineffectiveness towards
towards certain worms.
worms.
In this paper, we target the type of worms [7,
[7, 8,
8, 9, 10,
10, 12,
12, 13,
13, 30, 31,
3 1, 37]
371 that exploit traditional vulnerable servers
(e.g.,
(e.g., ApachelIIS,
ApacheIIIS, DNS, and Sendmail) to propagate themselves without any human intervention.
intervention. Qthe.r
Qther types of
worms (e.g., mass-mailing or 1M
IM worms [11]
[ l l ] involving end user interactions) are subjects of future
future work.
work. Our
contributions are mainly three-fold:
three-fold:
Firstly,
Firstly, we propose behavioral footprinting as a fundamentally new dimension for the characterization of self-

propagating worms.
worms. Unlike content fingerprinting
fingerprinting which extracts one or a few static
static worm-unique byte sequences as
signature, behavioral
behavioral footprinting essentially captures a worm's unique temporal action sequence during an infection
session, which covers the probing
probing

2,
2,

exploitation,
e.xploitation, and replication phases of the infection session. Our evaluation

(Section 4) with a number of real-world worms clearly demonstrates the existence of worm-specific
worm-specific behavioral foot-

prints.
Secondly,
traces. More
Secondly, we develop robust algorithms to extract the behavioral footprint from a worm's infection
infection traces.

phenotype and the complete
specifically,
specifically, by representing each step within a worm's infection session as a behavioral phenotype
infection
infection session as a behavioral phenotype sequence, we observe that the sequence reflects
reflects both worm-specific
worm-specific
exploitation and propagation strategies.
strategies. Given traces of only a few infection
infection sessions, our algorithms (Section 3) are
able to accurately and robustly extract a worm's behavior footprint, despite possible worm behavior mutation and
camouflaging, such as cloaking authentic phenotypes or forging phenotypes.
Thirdly,
Thirdly, by comparing with content-based fingerprinting,
fingerprinting, we demonstrate the uniqueness and robustness of behavior-

based footprinting
footprinting in worm recognition and identification.
identification. Because of their orthogonality,
orthogonality, behavior-based footprinting
is naturally robust against attacks that evade content-based fingerprinting.
fingerprinting. Our experiments show instances
instances of worms
that cannot be identified by content fingerprints
fingerprints but are recognizable using behavior footprints, justifying behavioral
footprinting as a complementary dimension
dimension for worm characterization.
The rest of this paper is organized
organized as follows:
follows: In Section 2,
2, we demonstrate the existence of behavioral footprints
2S
ome non-scanning worms may not have the probing phase.
'some

2

in self-propagating wonns
worms and make a case for the new dimension of behavior-based footprinting. We then describe
in Section 3 our algorithms to extract a worm's
worm's behavioral footprint. We present experimental results with a number
of real worms in Section 4. Limitations and possible improvements are described in Section 5.
5. We present related

work in Section 6 and finally conclude this paper in Section 7.
7.

2

A Case for Behavioral Footprinting
In this section, we first present a staged view of a wonn
worm infection session to motivate the characterization of wonn
worm

wonns:
behavior. As representative examples, we illustrate the existence of behavioral footprints in two well-known worms:

the MSBlaster worm propagating on Windows platform and the Lion worm on Linux platform. Finally, we make a
case for behavioral footprinting.
footprinting.

2.1

A Staged View of Worm Infection

In general, the infection of a self-propagating worm from an infected host to a victim host can be broken into three

phases:
Target Selection/Probing
SelectionIProbing
A Worm
A

Exploitation

A Victim
A

Replication
Replication

Figure
Figure 1. A Staged
Staged View of a Worm
Worm Infection
Infection Session
Session

probing
Phase J:
I : Target selection and probing

Using a strategy such as random or biased address scanning, a scanning

wonn during this stage attempts to pick up a victim for infection. For example, an ICMP echo request packet or a
worm
TCP SYN
SYN probe is used to infer the reachability of a chosen target. Additional packets may also be used to obtain the

version of a possibly vulnerable service.
service. We note that this phase may not exist for non-scanning worms because they
may carry a pre-computed target list.
Phase 2: E.xploitation
Exploitation

Once the wonn
worm receives a positive response from the victim host, a number of malicious

packets 3 may be sent over attempting to exploit the targeted vulnerability. Successful exploitation will result in the expackets3
wonns usually implement different functionalities
ecution of a specifically crafted code in the victim node. Different worms
in the crafted code.

Phase 3:
3: Replication

If the exploitation is successful, an additional replication phase may follow to transmit a

worm replica to the victim node. The replica will be installed in the victim node, completing this infection session.
We will show that the behavior exhibited by the worm during this infection session contains valuable self-identifying
information that can be used to characterize and identify the worm. Especially, the temporal order of infection steps
3There
'There are certain
cerrain worms such as SJammer[30j
Slammer[30] which might blindly send exploitation to any probed hosts.
hosts.

3

taken by the worm reflects the intrinsic dependencies that must be followed to ensure a successful infection.

2.2
2.2 Example I: Windows-Based MSBlaster Worm
We consider the infamous MSBlaster worm [9]
[9] as the first motivating example. The MSBlaster worm exploits an

RPC-DCOM vulnerability (MS03-026) for its infection.
infection. An MSBlaster infection session is illustrated in Figure 2.
The infection session consists of the following steps:
steps:
~~ID
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Figure 2. An Infection
Infection Session
Session of the MSBlasterlWindows
MSBlasterNVindows Worm

• A three-way TCP handshake on port 135
135 4 is implicitly used by the worm to check the reachability of the
selected target (Phase 1).
1).
• Upon the establishment of the TCP connection, the worm sends a number of malicious packets (Phase 2),

vulnerability[9] and contain a specially crafted shell-code. A successful
which exploit the known RPC-DCOM vulnerability[9]
exploitation will lead to the execution of the shell-code in the victim node. In the case of the MSBlaster worm,
a new shell service will be started on TCP port 4444 by the shell-code.
shell-code.
• The new shell service on 4444/TCP is immediately contacted by the worm to send instructions on how to
download the worm replica, i.e.,
i.e., msblast.exe (Phase 3).
3). From Figure 2, the TFTP protocol is apparently used
for the downloading.
The above sequence of actions significantly deviates from a normal access to the RPC-DCOM service: First, after

4444/TCP in the victim host.
the "service request",
request", a new shell service would not suddenly appear and listen on 4444/TCP
Second,
this port would not follow with the service request. Third and most importantly,
Second, a new TCP connection to this
it should not be observed that the victim took the initiative in using the TFTP protocol to download a file (with the

6,372 bytes) from the service client.
name msblast.exe and size 6,372
4Microsoft's
Service Control Manager (also known as the RPC Endpoint Mapper) uses this port as a well-defined
4 ~ i c r o s o f t ?DCOM
s
well-delined means to provide
port-mapping services associating available services with their ports.

4

2.3
2.3 Example
Example II:
11: Linux-Based
Linux-Based Lion Worm
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Figure 3.
3. An
An Infection
Infection Session
Session of the Lion/Linux
LionILinux Worm

The
The second illustrative example is the historical Linux-based Lion worm [4]. The Lion worm exploits a BIND
vulnerability (CA-2001-02) for
for its
its infection.
infection. A Lion worm infection session is shown in Figure 3.

The Lion worm firstly
firstly makes an explicit TCP connection attempt to the destination port 53. A successful con• The
indicates the reachability and possible vulnerability of the selected target (Phase 1).
I). This connection,
nection indicates
if established,
established, is
is then immediately tore down without transmitting any payload.
• Another TCP connection to the same destination port is then established. This time, certain exploitation codes

are sent (Phase
(Phase 2).
2).
are
the exploitation
exploitation is
is successful,
successful, the shell script,
script, which is transmitted together with the exploitation codes, will
• If the
be executed to retrieve a worm replica from the infecter to the victim (Phase 3).

Again, deviation from
from the normal access to DNS lookup service is observed: First, it is unlikely that the access
Again,
would begin with a plain TCP connection with no payload. Second and most importantly, after the DNS lookup

request, it is
is highly unusual that the BIND server on the victim side initiates a TCP connection to the DNS client
client on
request,

27374/TCP,
680 bytes from
an unusual port 2737
4/TCP, followed by an HTTP session on this connection to transfer a file of
of 71;
71,680
from
an
the client to
to the
the server.
sewer
the

2.4 Behavioral
Behavioral Footprinting:
Footprinting: aa New Dimension
Dimension
2.4
In general,
general, for
for the same vulnerable service, there exist intrinsic differences between a normal access to the service
In
service:
and aa worm infection through the service:

5

Firstly, during the exploitation phase of a worm infection session, a worm will attempt to misuse a vulnerable

[ I , 32, 47]
471 have leveraged this
fact, several recent works [I,
service in a way that is different from a normal access. In fact,
difference to derive vulnerability models for worm defense.
defense.

Secondly, the replication phase of a worm infection session should not happen during a normal access to the
service. In sharp contrast, it will appear in every successful worm infection. As shown in Figure 2, the
vulnerable service.

4444/TCP connection and its encapsulated TFTP transmission will appear in every MSBlaster worm infection.

27374/TCP
4/TCP connection and its encapsulated HTTP session can be observed for every Lion worm
Similarly, the 2737
infection (Figure 3).
Finally, the entire sequence of infection steps during an infection session characterizes the worm's behavior, and is
highly unlikely to appear in normal traffic. In fact, our experiments with real-world network traces result in zero false
false

positive. Furthermore, for different worms exploiting the same vulnerable service, their sequences of infection steps
are different. The reason is that different worms tend to have different exploitation means, replication idiosyncrasies,
idiosyncrasies,
and payloads, even though they are exploiting the same vulnerability (Section 4.2).
Based on the above observations, we are motivated to adopt a worm's infection step sequence during an infection

session to characterize and thus uniquely identify the worm. We call this new dimension behavioral footprinting,
fingerprinting. We emphasize that the two dimensions
in contrast to the well-known dimension of content-based fingerprinting.
5). Especially,
complement each other and they should be combined to overcome their own weaknesses (Section 5).
since behavioral footprinting does not rely on payload content analysis, it is naturally resistant to content-based

4.4.1,4.4.2).
mutation and encryption attacks (Sections 4.4.1,
4.4.2).

3

Footprint Representation
Representation and Extraction
Extraction
Behavioral Footprint
section, we first define the behavioral footprint and its representation. A simple pairwise
In this section,
pairwise alignment al-

sessions. To increase
gorithm is then presented to extract a behavioral footprint from the traces of two infection sessions.
the robustness against more intelligent worms, we develop an advanced footprint extraction algorithm to accurately

sessions.
extract a worm's behavioral footprint from multiple infection sessions.

3.1 Behavioral Phenotype and Footprint
The term "behavioral phenotype"
phenotype" was originally coined in 1972
1972 by Nyhan [35]
[35] to represent a behavior that was
genetically determined in the same way as the physical features of a phenotype. Recall the staged view of worm in-

worm's behavioral phenotypes, the sequence
fection session in Section 2, if we denote a worm's infection steps as the worm's
worm's intrinsic behavioral
of behavioral phenotypes manifested during the infection session will be defined as the worm's
footprint.
footprint. From Section 2, the behavioral footprint uniquely reflects the behavioral characteristics of the worm (e.g.,
(e.g.,
abused vulnerability, working exploitation, adopted propagation, and self-carried payload).

6

Our proposed algorithms to extract worm behavior footprints are based on the sequence analysis techniques extensively applied in bio-informatics areas. A common and important issue for bio-informatics research is to operate
over a large sequences
pattem(s) amon2
among them.
sequences of strings such as DNA, RNA, and protein sequences to find certain pattern(s)
Notice that any type of protein is a sequence of amino acid sub-units and there are only 20 different amino acids,
which constitute the whole alphabet for protein sequence analysis. Similarly, if we consider all possible behavioral
phenotypes during
of a worm can be represented as a
during the worm infection as the alphabet, the behavioral footprint of
sequence
of the MSBlaster worm, based
based on the
sequence of characters in the alphabet.
alphabet. For example,
example, the behavioral footprint of
t
+-----

sf

t
+-----

+-C

infection session in Figure 2,
R l S2St
A 2 ...
Ul Ul ....
R 2, where the characters'
characters'
2, can be represented as SI
SIS P Al
A I ...
. . . R]
s2s;A2
. - . UIUl
. . R2,
definitions
definitions are:
are:
Sj
S1 : < TCP,
TCP. 4581/infecter,
4581/in.fecter, 135/vi.ctim,
135/vl.ctim,SSY
YN >
t
+--

S:
S:

:

<
< TCP,
TCP. 135/victim,4581/infecter,SYN,ACK
135/victim,4581/infecter. S Y N . ACK >

A
Alj

:

<
ACK >
< TCP,
TCP. 4581/infecter,
4581/inf ecter, 135/victim,
135/11ictim,
ACK

R
RST >
R1j : <
< TCP,
TCP. 4581/infecter,
4581/in,f ecter, 135/victim,
135/victim:RST
S2
< TCP,
TCP. 4599/infecter,
4599/inf ecter, 4444/victim.
4444/1iictim.SSY
YN >
S2 : <
t
+--

S~
S;

:

<
N,. ACIC
ACK >
< TCP,
TCP. 4444/victim,
4444/zlictim: 4599/infecter,
4599/in,f ecter, SSY
YN

A
A22

:

<
< TCP'4599/in
TCP. 4599/inf ecter,4444/victim,ACK
ecter, 4444/victim,ACIC >

U
U1j

:

<
< UDP,
UDP. 1552/victim,
1552/victim, 69/infecter
G9linf ecter >

j
U
U1

:

<
DP, 69/infecter,
<U
UDP.
69/1:nf ecter, 1552/victim
1552/victirn >

R2
R
2

:

< TCP,
T C P ,4599/infecter,
4599/inf ecter, 4444/victim,
4444/victim,,RST
<
RST >

t
+--

The
The letters
letters in the above
above footprint denote either TCP flows with different control bits (SYN, ACK, RST) or
t
+-----

sf

UDPIICMP flows
flows (lJlI).
(UII). The subscripts denote different flows.
flows. For example, Sf or
UDP/ICMP

C
+--

sf5
st 5 represents the second step

(SYN and
and ACK bits set)
set) in a normal three-way TCP handshaking procedure. Without ambiguity, a unique well(SYN
further shortened as a single character.
character. For example, a TCP 3-way handshake sequence
known subsequence can be further
t
+-----

(e.g., sisf
s i s ? AAi,
i , ii == 1,2,
1 , 2 , in previous sequence) could be simply defined as Ci
(e.g.,
C i (more in Section 4).
In this
this example,
example, every character is a tuple of several fields:
fields: the character representing a specific TCP flow has four
In

< TCP,
TCP. source_port,
sourceport, desLport,
destqort!TCP control bits >; the character related to a specific UDP flow has three fields
fields <
fields
UDP.source_port,
sou,rce-port.desLport
destqort >.
>. Note that as different infection sequences might have different ports, a special
<< UDP,

field 6 needs to be introduced.
introduced. Using the MSBlaster worm as an example, the source ports (e.g., the port
wildcard field
C
+--

4581, 4599, 1552
1552 in SI,
S l , S2,
S2,U
Ul,
4581,
l , respectively) vary with different infection sessions while the destination ports are
t
+--

fixed (e.g., the
the port 135,4444,
135, 4444, 69
69 in SI,
S1,S2,
S2,U
U1,
fixed
of a fixed
l , respectively). As such, the special wildcard field (instead of

he arrow
arrow sign
sign is
is used to mark the traffic
traffk flow
flow direction and can be omitted when it is implicitly implied.
5The
h i t e set
set containing a limited number of values can also be introduced to more precisely capture the possible contents. For simplicity,
6'A
A finite
this paper only mentions the wildcard field.
field.
this

7

port number) is
is used for the source port field.
field. Also, there are some worms, which might have a constant source port
number (e.g., the Witty worm have a constant UDP source port 4000), but a random destination port. In this case,
the
the wildcard is
is used to represent the destination port field.
field. It is worth mentioning that although a worm infection
session usually involves only two nodes (infecter and victim), a coordinated worm infection might involve more than
used to
two
two nodes
nodes (e.g.,
(e.g., downloading the worm replica from a third-party). In this case, the wildcard field can be used
represent the infecter field.
field.

In
fixed. Additional fields can be added to each flow
In addition,
addition, the number of fields in a phenotype may not be fixed.
to
to include
include other meaningful information such as the packet length, particular content sequence, or even relative
of behavioral
behavioral
timing from
from the previous one (an example is shown in Section 3.3.1). In fact, the extensible nature of
of other dimensions. For example, the
phenotype representation makes it easier to integrate worm characteristics of
of the content
content-based fingerprint
fingerprint of a worm can be added to a behavioral phenotype, indicating the occurrence of
during
iance analysis and vulnerability-specific
vulnerability-specific information can also
during the corresponding infection step.
step. Protocol compl
compliance
be integrated to further improve the accuracy of worm identification.
However, we would like to point out that due to different understanding or emphasis even for the same worm,
of sequence length or field
different researchers might intend to extract different behavioral footprints (e.g., in terms of

content). Such situation is similar to the content-based counterpart: Different content fingerprints may be chosen by
content).
simplicity, this paper chooses a simple representation
different researchers for the same worm. For simplicity,
representation described
described in this
Section. As shown
shown in Section 4,
4, such representation is capable of accurately characterizing existing worms.
Section.

3.2 Pairwise
Pairwise Alignment
Alignment Algorithm
Algorithm
3.2
Based on the behavioral footprint representation, we first present an algorithm to extract a worm's
worm's behavioral

footprint from
from two
two infection sequences
sequences of the worm.
footprint

Pl =
= XIX2'"
~ 1 x 2 ..x,
.X n and §2
P2=
y l y 2 . . . ym,
Given two
two infection sequences §l
= YIY2'"
Ym, a pairwise alignment algorithm is
sequences so that they could have the same length. Based on a pre-defined scoring
primarily used to align these two sequences
(e.g., a match yields 1 while a mismatch yields 0),
O), the alignment algorithm inserts gaps, ifif necessary, to
matrix (e.g.,
achieve maximum al
alignment
ignment of the two sequences. The maximum alignment is defined as the sum of
of terms for each
achieve

< Xi,
xi;Yj
yj
aligned pair of characters <

> within the sequences (representing similarity s(xi;
S(Xi, yj)),
Yj )), plus terms for each gap

p). The similarity and gap penalty are defined as a part of
of the scoring matrix and might be
(representing penalty, p).

specific to
to different applicable scenarios. A global alignment scheme obtains the optimal global alignment between
specific
two sequences
sequences while a local alignment scheme looks for the best alignment between subsequences of
of them. There
two
are two
two corresponding well-known dynamic programming algorithms, i.e., Needleman-Wunsch algorithm[l8] and
are
algorithm[l8].
Smith-Waterman algorithm
[18].
The idea in Needleman-Wunsch algorithm is to build up an optimal alignment using previous solutions or optimal
The
alignments of smaller subsequences. A matrix Jft,
A, indexed by ii and j with one index for each sequence, is iteratively
8

constructed. The
XIX2 ....
Xi of
of x up to x,
Xi
The cell
cell .4(i,
&(i. 3j)) is
is the score of the best alignment between the initial segment xlx2
. . x,
and
= 00,, .4(i,
= -ip,
-ip, A
.4(O,j)
= --jp.
and the
the initial
initial segment
segment YIY2···
y 1 y 2 . . . Yj
yJ of Y
y up to Yj.
y J . Initially,
Initially, 041(0.0)
.&(O. 0 ) =
A(i7 00)) =
( 0 .j ) =
j p . Then, the
matrix
matrix is
is iteratively
iteratively filled
filled from
from top-left cells to bottom-right cells based on Eqn.(l).
j{(i -1.j -

o"ft(i,j) = max

!

1)

+ S(Xi,Yj), i2':

Lj 2': 1

ji(i - 1.j) - P.,

i 2': 1

.4'(1 . .7 - 1) - p.

.> 1
J-

(1)

Each case represents an option how current .4
of the other three cells (above-left
&(i. (i, jj)) cell is derived from one of
[i[i-- 1,
D. Once all values are calculated, the choices taken at each cell starting
1;j -- 1]'
11,above [i[i-- 1,
1:jj],
] , or left [i,
[i:j -- 111).
from
from the
the bottommost rightmost one are traced back so that an optimal global alignment is derived. An example

[12] is shown in Figure 4.
alignment applying
applying the
the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm to the Welchia worm [12]
I:
Sequence
Sequence]:

I1 1I I1 IICC IIFFIIFFIICC2U
IUI 1
ZU
U-I -- - RRz2

Sequence 2:
2:
Sequence

I II II II II II
I
- - C
IU2U2R
C IF
I F IF
I F IC2U
I C ~ UIUI U
I U Z U2Z R Z
C

C

C

Figure
Algorithm. The choices made during
during the alignment
Figure 4.
4. Global
Global Alignment with
with Needleman-Wunsch
Needleman-WunschAlgorithm.
"-" and
and "I".
"I". The "."
"-" in
in the top sequence
sequence used
4 corresponds to the choice
are shown
shown as
as "-"
are
used as index i for
for.4
"above"
used as index j for .4
[i, jj - 11,
1],
"above" [i[i-- 1,
1:j],
j ] , the "-"
"-"in
in the bottom
bottom sequence
sequence used
4 represents "left" choice [i,
while the"
the "I"I" in
in the middle
middle shows
shows the option
option "above-left"
"above-left" [i
[i1,j 11.
- 1,
- 1].
while

Eqn.(l) is modified for local alignment purpose. ParticuSmith-Waterman algorithm works similarly except that Eqn.(I)
larly, one
one more case is
is added to reflect the possibility of starting a new local alignment. As such, the entry of
( 2 , jj))
of 4.4(i,
larly,
is refined with the
the value max(.4
m a x ( A ((i,i ,jj),
) . 0)
0 ) during the iterative
iterative calculation of
is
of Eqn.(l).
Eqn.(I). The traceback is not performed
from the
the bottommost rightmost cell,
cell, but from the cell with the maximum value7.
from
value 7 . Keen readers might find another
another
of matches) to the
interesting application with the Smith-Waterman algorithm: if we associate a metric (e.g., number of

Sland §2,
S 2 , the metric can also be used to indicate the similarity among
best alignment between subsequences of §1
the two
two sequences.
sequences. In fact,
fact, the Smith-Waterman alignment is used in the next algorithm as a similarity-based scoring
the
mechanism to
to build the relevant phylogenetic tree from
from a number of worm infection sequences.
mechanism
is interesting that most existing self-propagating worms are still primitive with no behavior-polymorphic capabilIt is
ities. Our experiments in Section 4 show that pairwise alignment is highly effective in extracting worm-characterizing
ities.
behavioral footprints.
footprints. However,
However, even though the majority of current self-propagating worms are not polymorphic in
behavioral
behavior, it is
is likely
likely that future
future worms will be more intelligent, given that certain libraries [16,25,42]
behavior,
[16,25,42] rendering code
are readily available.
available. As a result, the pairwise alignment algorithm might not be capable of
polymorphic are
of characterizing future
future worms.
worms.
ing
7'A
A

tie can be broken by arbitrarily choosing any cell with the maximum value
tie
value.
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3.3 Phylogenetic Tree Algorithm
In this section, we propose a robust algorithm to extract behavioral footprints
footprints of more advanced
advanced worms. The
algorithm is based on our observation on the existence of behavioral invariants. Before presenting the algorithm,
algorithm, we
further justify the existence of behavioral invariants
invariants even in advanced worms.

3.3.1
3.3.1 Examining Behavior Invariants
Invariants
Similar to its counterpart - the content-polymorphic worm, a behavior-polymorphic worm could exhibit varying

behavior during different infection sessions.
sessions. Here we consider single-vector worms which target one vulnerability,
vulnerability,
because a multi-vector worm can be considered as the combination of several
several single-vector worm variants, each
with only one infection vector.
vector. We have so far studied at least twenty self-propagating worms and their variants
(including behavior-polymorphic worms we synthesize)
synthesize) targeting a number of different services on top of various
various
them. Although we are not claiming that all worms
operating systems,
systems, and have found
found behavioral invariant
invariant in each of them.

will exhibit behavioral invariants,
invariants, a significant fraction of them do, because behavioral invariants typically result
from (l)
( I ) restrictions imposed for successful exploitations, (2)
(2) common components in each infection session (e.g.,
(e.g.,
same payload and replication method of a worm), or (3)
(3) in some cases, a worm's idiosyncrasies in its exploitation

means, replication mechanisms, and self-carrying payloads. We present two examples to illustrate how restrictions
for successful exploitations determine a worm's behavior invariants.
invariants.
The first
first example is related to the OpenSSL heap-based buffer overflow
overtlow exploited by the Siapper
Slapper worm.
worm. As described in [37],
[37], the overflow
overflow is used twice by the worm to achieve a reliable infection. The first OpenSSL exploitation
only attempts to locate the over-writable heap address within the vulnerable Apache address space,
space, which is hardly

predictable across all the servers. After the first
first exploitation,
exploitation, the acquired heap address is patched in the attack buffer
within the second OpenSSL exploitation. It is expected that this two-phase exploitation enables a reliable infection.
However,
However, it has one more restriction that the two Apache processes handling these two exploitation connections
should have the same heap layout, and thus ensure the validity of the heap address obtained from the first exploitation
connection to the second exploitation connection.
Apache's
connection. To satisfy the restriction, the worm must first exhaust the Apache's
pool of servers before actual exploitation.
connections88
exploitation. The exhaustion is achieved by opening a succession of 20 connections
so that two fresh Apache processes can be spawned to handle the two exploitation connections.
connections. As such, a reliable
Siapper
Slapper worm infection requires a series of resource-exhausting TCP connections and two additional exploitations.
These requirements will be essentially reflected as the behavioral invariants or invariant subsequence in Slapper

worm's behavioral footprint. We will further analyze the Slapper worm in Section 4.4.3.
The second example is related to the Slammer worm exploiting a simple buffer-overrun
buffer-overrun vulnerability in MS SQL
servers.
servers. Due to the nature of the exposed vulnerability, only a single UDP packet with the following properties:
sThe
he number 20 is related to the StartServers entry in the Apache configuration file.
file.
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destination port 1434, packet type 4,
4 , and size larger than 60 bytes, will successfully trigger the buffer overflow. Such

requirement leads to the behavioral invariant of the Slammer worm, and is reflected in its behavioral footprint as:
as:
UDP.
1434/*.pnyload : "1041".
"1041".sIze
> 60
60 >.
>.
<U
DP. */*. 1434/*,payload
size>
3.3.2 Building the Phylogenetic Tree
9
By operating over a collection of a worm's infection sequences
, the worm's
sequences9,
worm's behavioral invariants can be reliably

extracted by advanced sequence analysis techniques. More specifically, pairwise alignment is first performed to
derive their relative similarities with each other (a.k.a., the Smith-Waterman alignment). Based on the similarities,

phylogenetic tree will be built to guide the final stage of multiple sequence alignment to expose and extract the
a plzylogenetic

behavioral invariants.
invariants.
A phylogenetic tree is originally proposed to depict the evolutionary relationships of a group of life organisms.
organisms.

Here we are building the phylogenetic tree to extract the most fundamental footprint subsequences or invariants that

Ln. Some of the sequences might be
are embedded within a number of related infection sequences :#k,
S k , k == l..n.
explicitly mutated by inserting irrelevant subsequences
subsequences or replacing some subsequence with another functionallyequivalent string. An algorithm called UPGMA [18]
[18] originally used in gene analysis has been applied to construct
such a tree. Initially, each sequence :#k
Skis considered as a cluster Gk.
C k . These clusters are iteratively grouped with the

most related one so that, eventually, there is only one cluster left. The relatedness or similarity between two clusters
G
Cii and G
Cjj is defined as diji j ::

(2)
where IIGil1
IICiII and IIGjl1
JICjIIdenote the number of sequences in clusters G
Cii and G
Cj.
dpq
j . The value of d
pq is derived based on
the Smith-Waterman scoring algorithm. The clustering algorithm is further described as follows:
follows:
PHYLOGENETICTREECONSTRUCTION(:#k,
k =
PHYLOGENETICTREECONSTRUCTION(S~
= 1··
1 . . . n)
n)

1 G
<- 0;T <- 0
C+-@;T+-@
2

3
4
5

for each sequence :#i
n
Si ii EE 1..
1 ..n
do
Assign a cluster G
Cii <+ {:#i}
{Si)
and add it into G
C

<+-

G
C UG
Cii

6

Define a leaf N
Nii in T for :#i
Si

7

for each any other sequence :#j,
S j , j EE ii + 1 ...
. . .n
n

8

+

do
Calculate the similarity between :#i
Si and :#j
Sj

9
10
10

11
11

d iji j
while IIIICll
Gil

<+-

SMITH-WATERMAN(:#i,:#j)
SMITH-WATER MAN(^^, S j )

-I-# 1

9Such
4.1.2).
'such infection sequences can be safely collected by unleashing the worm in our experimental environment (Section 4.1.2)

11
11

12
12

do Determine the two clusters Cj
Ci and Cjj
s.t.
s.t. d ijjj is maximum

13
13
14
14

Define a new cluster C
U Cjj
Ck
= Cj
Ci U
k =
and calculate d
dkl
k1 for all l1

15
15
16
16

Remove Cj
Ci and Cjj from C,
C , i.e.,
i.e., C
C -t C
C -- C
Cii -- Cjj

17
17

Add Ck to C , i.e., C t C U Ck
AddCktoC,i.e.,C-CUC
k

18
18

Add a parent node Nk
Nk to T
N i and N jj
T with children Ni

19

return T
T

The calculation in d
dkr
15 can be conveniently performed based on following equation:
equation:
kl in step 15

(3)

The time and space complexity of the algorithm is O(n
0 ( n 22),) ,since there are nn -1
- 1 iterations, with O(n)
O ( n ) steps in each
one.

3.3.3
Aligning Multiple
3.3.3 Aligning
Mu1 tiple Sequences
The phylogenetic tree is used to categorize the worm footprint sequences and guide the actual alignment of multiple
sequences. Within the generated tree T
T the leaves contain the raw footprint sequences while intermediate nodes
contain the sequences representing their children nodes. A simple post-order tree traversal algorithm (shown below)
can be recursively applied to construct the representative sequences until the root of the tree T
T is reached.
MULTIPLESEQUENCEALIGNMENT(T:
MULTIPLESEQUENCEALIGNMENT(T
: PhylogeneticTree)

I1

2

i f T i=
# NULL
NULL
iCT
then MULTIPLESEQUENCEALIGNMENT(T.left);
MULT~PLESEQUENCEAL~GNMENT(T.~~
ft);

3

MULTIPLESEQUENCEALIGNMENT(T.right);
MUL~TIPLESEQUENCEAL~GNMENT(T.I-ight);

4

iCT.left
i f T.le f t

5
6

i=
# NULL
N U L L AND T.right i=
# NULL
NULL

then T.sequence -t
NEEDLEMAN-WuNscH(T.left,
NEEDLEMAN-WUNSCH
f t (, TT.right)
. r~i~g h t )

The actual sequence construction is based on the global alignment alignment, i.e., the ~
Needleman-Wunsch
e e d l e m a n - ~ u n z calgoh

rithm (Section 3.2). An example run of the algorithm against a Welchia worm variant is illustrated in Fig 5. The
sequence shown at the root of the tree
+--

+--

< variable>
variable > C
CII ~
6 VI
~<
<2variable>
variable
6 ~ ~
> R2
<
FI F1
R2
I C2VI
is extracted as the behavioral footprint for the Welchia worm.
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Figure
Figure 5. An Example
Example Alignment
Alignment of Multiple
Multiple Worm Sequences/Footprints.
Sequences/Footprints. These three sequences
sequences are
modified
Welchia worm sequence (Section
modified from
from the original
original Welchia
(Section 4.3) for illustration
illustration purpose. The first
sequence
sequence ignores
ignores the second
second tftp
rflp UDP
UDP connection
connection for the SVCHOST.exe file. The second sequence
sequence
contains
contains the original
original infection
infection sequence.
sequence. The last one ignores
ignores the first ICMP
ICMP probing.
probing.

4 Evaluation
In this section, we first describe our experimental environment (Section 4.1), which is used to trap "live"
"live7' worms
and analyze historical worms.
worms. We then derive these worms' behavioral footprints (Section 4.2) and demonstrate their

validity by showing that they not only differ significantly from normal service access behavior, but also accurately
characterize the behavior of corresponding worms.
worms. Later, by comparing with content-based fingerprinting, our ex-

periments further demonstrate the uniqueness (Section 4.3) and robustness (Section 4.4) of behavioral footprinting
footprinting in
worm recognition and identification.
identification.

4.1

Experimental
Experimental Environments
Environments .

Behavioral footprints
footprints characterize worms by capturing their dynamic infection sequences. The difficulty
difficulty in valivalidating the proposed scheme lies in the safe collection of infection sequences of real-world worms.
worms. To address this
challenge, we have implemented and deployed (l)
(1) Collapsar [22],
[22], a honeyfarm
honeyfarm architecture to trap live,
live, real-world

worms and (2) vGround [23],
[23], a virtual worm playground environment to safely unleash and observe the dynamic
infection behavior of historical real-world worms.

4.1.1

Trapping
Trapping Live Worms

The goal of trapping live worms is to collect their malicious infection sequences. To achieve this goal, there are

two important considerations:
considerations:
• Honeypot services on dark address space There is a high concentration of malicious traffic in a dark (namely,
pot services [22]
space. By further deploying high-interaction honey
honeypot
[22] in such dark adadunallocated) IP address space.
dress spaces, we are able to collect original traces of self-propagating worms. In our experimental environment
(Collapsar), honeypots are deployed using virtual machines enabled by both VMware [6]
[6] and User-Mode Linux
(UML) [17].
[ 171.
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• Off-site
Off-site and distributed worm capture A high-interaction honeypot can be infected as a real host by propagating worms. To collect a diverse
traffic
diverse set of worm infection traces, we have developed a number of honeypot traffic
redirectors, which forward dark space traffic
traffic from distributed participating sites to a centralized location for
easy worm trace collection. By using traffic
traffic re-direction techniques such as Proxy-ARP and GRE [20,21], the
traffic
traffic redirectors are transparent to remote worm infectors.
We first started the prototype of Collapsar in February 2003 and it was initially deployed in August 2003. Three

redirectors are deployed in three Ethernet-based production networks and forward traffic to a centralized facility,
facility,
which is located in a separate Ethernet LAN. Encouragingly, right after its deployment, it successfully captured one
instance of the MSBlaster worm.
worm. Later in August 2004, we expanded Collapsar deployment
deployment to three more production

networks: one local subnet network (20 IP addresses), one wireless LAN, and one DSL network. The DSL network
is located in another administrative domain.
domain. The honeypots run a variety of commodity operating systems,
systems, including
RedHat Linux 7.2/8.0,
7.218.0, Windows
Windows XP Home Edition, FreeBSD 4.2, and Solaris 8.0.
8.0. All traffic from/to
fromlto these honeypots
are fully logged through the tcpdump tool. Using Collapsar, a number of live real-world worms such as MSBlaster
[9],
[9], Enbiei [8],
[8], Welchia [12], and Sasser [13]
[13] are captured

10.
'O.

Further analysis of the worms are presented in Section

4.2.

4.1.2
4.1.2 Analyzing Historical Worms
Our honeyfarm architecture Collapsar is able to capture currently propagating worms. However, it is unable to
analyze other historical worms.
worms. To this end, we have created a virtual
virtual worm playground environment called vGround,
where worms can be safely unleashed and monitored. vGround has the following features:

• Highfidelity with full-system
full-system virtualization Within a vGround, realistic end-hosts and network entities (e.g.,
(e.g.,
routers and firewalls)
firewalls) are emulated using virtual machines [6,
[6, 17].
171. The adoption of virtual machines brings
great convenience and flexibility
flexibility in supporting unmodified vulnerable services and operating systems.
systems.

• Strict confinement with link-layer
link-layer network virtualization

A vGround is used to experiment with malicious,

destructive worms. A confined virtual network is necessary to strictly contain malicious worm traffic and worm
damage. To this end, we have developed a link-layer network virtualization technique to safely intercept and
completely confine worm traffic within the virtual playground. Our current vGround prototype supports both
VMware and UML-based virtual machines.
We have successfully experimented with a number of historical worms and their variants, including Lion worm
[4],
[4], Slapper worm [37],
[37], Ramen worm [7],
[7], and SARS worm [10].
[lo]. For each experiment,
experiment, the dynamic infection traces
are captured using the tcpdump tool.
tool. The analysis is presented in the next section.
IONote
particularly
' O ~ o t ethat due to the limited scale of our current deployment, it is less likely to capture all of Internet worms which are active parlicularly
firsl day (May I,
2004) of its outbreak.
at their early stage.
stage. However, Collapsar did capture Sasser worm on the
thefrsr
1.2004)
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4.2
4.2 Extracting Behavioral Footprints
With
With collected tcpdump
tcpdump log files,
files, the next step is to extract flow sequences relevant to worm infections. We develop
extracted and
aa tool
for this purpose: all TCP/UDP/ICMP
TCPIUDPIICMP flow
flow sequences contained within the log are extracted
tool named sneeze for

TCPIUDP/ICMP sequences are
additional packet reassembly or re-ordering, if necessary, is also performed. These TCP/UDPlICNIP
separated with respect to each address
address pair and are further ordered based on the associated time-stamp. The duration
and
and payload size
size of each flow
flow is also automatically calculated by sneeze.
An example
6. The trace input is related to an complete infection session
example output from
from sneeze is shown in Figure 6.
of the
1, 2004.
the Sasser worm, which is captured by Collapsar on May I,
~~~~.~"(ill:~~~.~:~.~.alI

. ": --~"~~~~.:O:-.~·.,S_n_~;l,~:.T~!,-i.
par ls 1024 S ./sneeze -C -r sasser. t.cpdump
1).0.1. at 2005-1)1-20 22:12 EST
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Figure
Figure 6. An Example
Example Output of the Sneeze Tool

flows, sneeze is able to track relevant TCP states. Specifically, within
Note that when analyzing related TCP flows,
TCP flows,
flows, any
any TCP control packet with SYN,
SYN, ACK, FIN, or RST bit set are contained within the resulting
extracted TCP
sequence. The
The TCP data packets (though ACK bit turned on) are usually ignored. However, as discussed in
infection sequence.
3.1, additional content sequence,
sequence, protocol compliance analysis, or even vulnerability-related information can
Section 3.1,
be integrated here
here to further enrich the accuracy and effectiveness of worm footprints.
footprints. We are currently extending the
be
for such integration. UDP and ICMP flows
flows are also recorded within the sequence.
prototype for
considering each interaction as the behavioral phenotype, the algorithm described in Section 3 is applied on
By considering
these multiple interaction sequences to extract representative behavioral footprints. The results are shown in Table
these
1. Within the
the table,
table, those letters denote
denote either TCP flows
flows with different control bits or UDPIICMP
UDP/ICMP flows. Also, the
I.

Cii represents the well-known three-way TCP connection handshake. However, the same letter usually means
letter C

field contents (e.g., the destination port number) for different footprints.
different field
footprints.
It isis encouraging to
to note that we are able to reliably extract behavioral footprints for all worms examined. The
It
worm II is similar to MSBlaster
MSBlaster
footprint of the MSBlaster worm has been pictorially shown in Figure 2. Welchia worm''

worm except that an
an initial
initial ICMP probing packet is generated before actual infection and the second TCP connection
worm
he Welchia
Welchia worm
worm is
is aa multi-vector
multi-vector worm,
worm. which
which takes
takes advantage
advantage of
of two vulnerabilities, i.e., the RPC-DCOM vulnerability (MS03-026)
liThe
and WebDAV
WebDAV vulnerability
vulnerability (MS03-007).
(MS03-007). Due
Due to
to the
the lack
lack of
of the
the vulnerable
vulnerable 11s
lIS server
server in
in our
our environment
environment setup.
setup, the
the WebDAV-based
WebDAV-based infection
infection
and
is not able
able to
to be reproduced.
is
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Name

InfecTion VeCTOr
liifecriori
Vecror

Caprured Date
Captured

Platforms

Aug. 28. 2003
2003
CIRIC2UjUIR2
CIRICZUIUIRZ
t
, < < t
17.2003
2003
II h
11
I ICIFIFjC2UjUjU2U2R2
C I F I F I C ~ U I U I U Z U Z R ~ Sep. 17.

Windows

FooTprinrs Derived
Behavioral Foorprinrs
t

MSBlasler
MSBlasier

RPC-DCOM vulnerability (MS03-026)

Welchia

RPC-DCOM vulnerability (MS03-026)
WebDAV vulnerability (MS03-007)

Enbiei

RPC-DCOM vulnerability (MS03-026)

Sasser

LSASS vulnerability (MS04-01 J)
1)

-

CjRjC2UjUjR2
12,2003
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1,2004
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R ~
j
sf
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Sj
S :Sj
~ RRIC
I 2ZRR
C ~(fuwed)
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R~
2CZ3R3
F
Sj
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C IFI FI ( 2 2 (23 F3 F3 R2
j
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t
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LPRng vulnerability (CVE-2000-0917)

WU-FTPD vulnerability (CVE-2000-0573)
WU-FfPD
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Slapper
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BIND vulnerability (CA-2001-02)
OpenSSL vulnerability (CA-2002-23)
Samba vulnerability (CAN-2003-0201)
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Characterizing Self-Propagating
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Figure 7. Behavioral
Behavioral Footprints
Footprints of the Ramen
Ramen Worm, a Multi-Vector Worm
;
-t

(C
(C2)
2 ) is initiated from the victim with a connect-back shell-code. Note that though MSBlaster and Welchia exploit

different. Enbiei worm exhibits a footprint similar to that of
the same vulnerability, their behavioral footprints are different.
;
-t

thefrp protocol (C3)
(C3) to download
MSBlaster worm but has a different worm binary and payload. Sasser worm uses theftp
the worm replica.
replica. Within the ftp session,
reverse connect-back activity
session, a PORT primitive is initiated to start another reverse

(C4).
Table I1 also shows the footprints of several
several historical worms, which are derived
derived from our worm playground envienvi-

amen

(vGround). Ramen worm is a multi-vector worm, which has three infection vectors (IVs):
(IVs): LPRng (CVE(CVEronment (vGround).
2000-0917),
2000-0917), wu-ftpd (CVE-2000-0573),
(CVE-2000-0573), and nfs-utils (CVE-2000-0666).
(CVE-2000-0666). Interestingly, the exploitation on the wu-ftp

1V is flawed,
flawed, which could not result in a success infection. The footprints for Ramen worms on different infection
IV
vectors are also visualized in Figure 7. Note that an initial TCP control packet with SYN and FIN bits

(sf)
(SF)set,

source port being 21, and destination port being 21, is used to probe the victim among all three IV-specific
1V-specificfootprints.
Another three examined worms, i.e.,
i.e., Lion, Slapper,
Slapper, and SARS
SARS worms, are single-vector worms. Lion worm has been
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described in Section 2.3. We defer the discussion of Siapper
Slapper worm in Section 404.
4.4. SARS
SARS worm is a multi-platform
worm, which is able to spread across various platforms (e.g,
(e.g, Debian 3.0, Gentoo IA.x,
1.4.x, Mandrake 8.x/9.0,
8.d9.0, Redhat

8.x19.0, SuSE 7.x/8.x,
7.x18.x, FreeBSD 4.x/5.0,
4.x15.0, NetBSD 1.5/1.6,
I .5/1.6, and OpenBSD 3.2). Its visual
6.x/7.x/8.019.0, Slackware 8.x/9.0,
6.xl7.x/8.0/9.0,
presentation is omitted due to space constraint.
We would like to highlight that all of these behavior sequences are uniquely exhibited by the corresponding worms
and to the best of our knowledge, are not exhibited within any other normal accesses to corresponding services.

4.3 Uniqueness of Behavioral Footprinting
4.3
Behavioral footprinting captures worms' characteristics based on their infection cycles. In this section, we demonstrate the benefit obtained from this new dimension for worm identification. To this end, we perform trace-driven
worm recognition experiments. More specifically, the sneeze utility (Section 4.2) is modified to serve as a worm
recognition tool using worms' behavioral footprints.
(80M containing 3 live worm infections)
footprints. We use a 7-hour trace (80M
collected by Collapsar [22]
[22] to demonstrate the benefit of worm behavioral footprinting.
footprinting. For comparison, we first
J2
snort, to detect possible intrusions
. Our own tool, sneeze, is
apply a popular open-source content-based IDS, i.e., snort,
intrusions12.

then applied to the same trace. Sneeze is able to identify all three worm infections in the trace with 0% false positive.
The results from snort and sneeze are shown in Table 2 and Figure 8, respectively.

D I
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1
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2
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5
6
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8
9
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Sources II # Dests
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156
I1
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NETBIOS 5MB-DS
SMB-DS IPC$ share unicode access
6
I1
S17orr SignG!ure
Sigrlarrwe
Snarl

I

Worm Detection
Detection with Content
Content Fingerprints
Fingerprints
Table 2. Worm

As Table 2 shows, snort performs reasonably well in recognizing various RPC DCOM buffer overflow attempts,
and in reporting numerous alerts for "ICMP PING CyberKit 2.2 Windows",
Windows", which correspond to the probing traffic
from Welchia worms. However, these alerts are distinct alerts even though they might be caused by the same worm

successful worm infections and
infection session. Figure 8 shows the result from sneeze.
sneeze. Sneeze naturally identifies 3 successfil

[22]). Further manual analysis shows that
also reports 2 unsuccessful worm infections (which were not discovered in [22]).
one unsuccessful worm infection has erroneously generated a wrong address (192.168.1.59) to download the worm
replica while another unsuccessful infection has a flawed exploitation in binding the command shell service. Since

flp protocol is used for all these worms, we would like to compare both outputs in this aspect. Table 2 reports 4
tftP
12The
he signature database used in the snort has been updated to contain lares!
laresr content fingerprints for known intnJsions.
intrusions.
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Figure
with Behavioral
Figure 8. Worm Detection
Detection and Identification
Identification with
Behavioral Footprints
Footprints

alerts with messages "TFTP GET" while Figure 8 further shows that one tftp is related to the Enbiei worm, one tftp
is related to the MSBlaster worm, and the other two tftp are related to the Welchia worm, which uses one tftp
t ' p session
to download the file
SVCHOST.exe (a tftpd
rfrp session for SVCHOST.eze
file DLLHOST.exe (the worm payload) and the other tftp
daemon).
The comparison clearly demonstrates the uniqueness of the behavioral footprinting dimension. From the content
dimension,
dimension, snort inspects every incoming/outgoing packet and raises a general alert if a malicious content sequence is
detected. From the behavior dimension, sneeze is able to recognize individual
individual worms once the behavioral footprints
footprints
are matched.

4.4 Robustness of Behavioral Footprinting
Previous subsections demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness in extracting behavioral footprints
footprints for worm
characterization and recognition. In the following, we further compare the robustness of behavioral footprinting
footprinting with

the popular content fingerprinting dimension under three different types of mutation attacks.

4.4.1
4.4.1 A Content-Mutation Attack
In this experiment,
experiment, we examine the robustness under a simple content-mutation attack. The Slapper worm IS
is
chosen for the comparison.
Within the snort system,
system, there are two Slapper-related signatures shown in Table 3. To compare, a vGround

with 100
100 virtual
virtual nodes is firstly
firstly instantiated and an instance of the original
original Slapper worm is introduced into the
environment. A tcpdump trace file
file containing the infection of slapper worms is randomly selected. Snort reports

five alerts for "WEB-MISe
"WEB-MISC Bad
two alerts on the log file
file with the message "MISe
"MISC OpenSSL Worm Traffic" and five
HTTPII.I
HTTPI 1 . 1 Request".
Then, another experiment is conducted by performing a simple mutation of the Slapper worm content: replacing

the string "TERM=xterm"
"TERM=xterm" with "TERM=linux"
"TERM=1inux7' and "GET /I HTTP/1.1"
HTTPII. 1" (the banner grabbing routine) with "GET
18

D

I Alert
A/en Message

Snort Signature

TERM=xterm
TERM=xterrn
GET //HlTP/l.l
HTTPI I . I

1I
22

MISe
MISC OpenSSL
OpenSSL Worm Traffi c
WEB-MISe
HTTP/I .I
WEB-MISC Bad HTTP/l.l
Request
Reauest. Potentially
Potentiallv Worm Attack

Table 3.
3. Snort Signatures
Signatures for the Siapper
Slapper Worm

HTTPIlO". The same vGround is used to experiment with the modified Siapper
/ HTTPtlO".
Slapper worm. Once the contents are
mutated, no alert is generated by snort from any worm propagation trace. Other recent work [45]
[45] has also confirmed

the in-effectiveness
in-effectiveness of content fingerprints under content mutation attacks.
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Figure 9. The Behavior
Behavior Footprint
Footprint of the Siapper
Slapper Worm
Worm

Behavioral footprinting demonstrates its robustness under this attack. In both cases, sneeze is able to identify the
same behavioral sequence of the Siapper
Slapper worm. As visualized in Figure 9, the slapper worm firstly opens a normal
f-t

TCP connection (C1F1F
(C1FlF 1l ) against port 80 checking the reachability of remote host; It then issues an invalid HTTP
f-t

GET request (C2F2,
(C2F2,half-close;
half-close containing the second content signature used in snort) to grab the server banner and
query the version of web server; Later on, it further establishes 20 simultaneous plain TCP connections

(n;:3 Ci,
Ci,

opened without any payload and never shutdown) on 443
443 port to prepare for the two following exploitations (C
(C23,
23 ,
C24).
C24). Finally, a flurry
fluny (>
(> 10,
10; 000) of short packets (1
(1 byte in payload) can be observed for the C24
C24TCP connection.

4.4.2
4.4.2 A Traffic-Encryption
Traffic-Encryption Attack
In this experiment, we examine the robustness when the whole worm traffic is encrypted.
As pointed out in [37],
[37], the original Siapper
Slapper worm is propagated through the transmission of a uuencoded version of

the unencrypted worm source code. In this experiment, a synthesized Slapper variant is first instructed to encrypt the
worm source file before propagation and then it is instructed to decrypt the file before compiling it and executing the

19
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Analysis on
Figure 10. N-Gram
N-Gram Analysis
on the Original
Original Slapper Worm
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Figure
Figure 11. N-Gram
N-Gram Analysis of the Siapper
Slapper Worm
Variant with
with Encrypted
Encrypted Transmission
Transmission

n-Iength combinations of bytes) is
worm binary in the infected victim. N-Gram analysis (counting the frequency of n-length
perlormed over two infection instances:
Slapper worm with transfer of unencrypted worm source
performed
instances: one for the original Siapper
(shown in Figure 10)
Slapper worm variant with encrypted source (shown in Figure II).
I I).
10) and the other for the Siapper
The N-gram analysis on the original Siapper
Slapper worm trace shows several common strings with a much higher frequency of occurrence than other strings. However, these strings are not the same as the signature adopted in snort to
detect Siapper
Slapper worms. In fact,
fact, the signature used in snort "TERM=xterm"
"TERM=xterm7' only happens twice within the N-Gram
analysis.
analysis. It suggests that the most-recurring content blocks are not necessarily suitable for signature purpose. Once
the transmission is encrypted, almost every string has equal probability of occurrence. On the other hand, the se-

I0. u;z3

C2
Il;~3 CiC23C24
quence C
C1
Fl1 Ii;
FlC2F2
CiC23C24is exhibited in both the original and the synthesized Siapper
Slapper worm infections,
1F
t

t

which demonstrates the applicability of behavioral footprinting even to worms that encrypt their traffic.
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from 20 Polymorphic
Figure 12. A Phylogenetic
Phylogenetic Tree Built from
Polymorphic Behavioral
Behavioral Sequences
Sequences of the Siapper
Slapper Worm
Variant

4.4.3
4.4.3 A Behavior-Polymorphism Attack
The previous two experiments demonstrate the robustness of worm footprints against content-mutation and traffic
encryption attacks. In this experiment,
experiment, we further examine the robustness of worm footprints against a behavior-

20

polymorphism attack.
Instead of following the behavior sequence shown in its original footprint, a behavior-polymorphic Slapper worm

( I ) intentionally introducing an arbitrary number of irrelevant or miscellaneous
variant is crafted, which is capable of (I)
sequences during the infection 13;
1 3 ; (2)
(2) intentionally adding a certain random timing delay among any two consecutive
infection steps; and (3) intelligently changing the IP address from which to download the attack payload, including
the worm replica. However, as restricted by the way to exploit the OpenSSL heap vulnerability (Section 3.3.1), the
temporal order in the original behavior sequence has to be maintained to ensure successful infection.
A vGround with 1500
1500 virtual nodes is constructed and all successful infection sessions are recorded for sequence
analysis. For brevity and readability, Figure ]2
12 only shows the phylogenetic tree built from collected traces with
20 infection instances. The numbers in the leaf
leaf nodes are index numbers from 11 to 20. The values in intermediate
nodes indicate normalized similarity ([0,
([O: 1])
I.]) based on Smith-Waterman algorithm (Section 3.2).
3.2). Lower value indicates

-2 and
higher similarity between the two sub-clusters. The penalty used for each gap through the algorithm is p == -2
the scoring matrix used for Smith-Waterman algorithm is

ss(i,j)
( i .j ) ==

xi=yj

2,
2.
.

{ -1,
-1;

(4)

otherwise.
otherwise.

As we observe, the phylogenetic tree algorithm is still able to extract the most critical part of the original be-

n:z3

havior sequence:
sequence: n7~3 CiC23C24,
C$23C24, demonstrating the resilience of behavioral footprinting against the behaviorpolymorphism attack.

5

Limitations
Limitations
As a new dimension to characterize self-propagating worms, behavioral footprinting shows great potential in iden-

tifying all infection incidents of each real-world worm we have experimented with. However, we would like to point
out that behavioral footprinting is proposed to enrich worm characterization along with other dimensions, e.g., content fingerprinting.
fingerprinting. It alone could lead to either incomplete or inaccurate worm characterization. In the following,
following, we

footprinting. Such limitations also call for further improvement of this new
describe current limitations of behavioral footprinting.
dimension and the adoption of a multiple-dimensional approach to worm characterization and identification.

Behavior substitution attacks Our current pairwise alignment algorithm leverages a basic sequence alignment
technique, or more specifically, a simple predefined scoring matrix (Section 3.2), to align worm infection sequences

derived. An attacker might intentionally introduce some substiwhere a worm-identifying behavioral footprint is derived.
tutable subsequence,
subsequence, which attempts to corrupt the alignment process while still achieves its goal for infection or

propagation. For example,
example, within the Replication phase (Figure]),
(Figure I), different transport channels or even tunneling can
I3we would like to point out that though the worm is able to initiate the connections (e.g., ICMP/TCP/UDP
ICMPITCPIUDP flows) to the victim node, it can
13We
not control the reverse direction as the victim is not under its control yet before a successful
a~ccessfulexploitation.

2]

be leveraged
leveraged to retrieve the worm replica.
However,
However, if we re-examine the motivation behind the sequence analysis and consider each behavior substitution
as a possible mutation, such attack is reminiscent of the classic challenge faced by biologists on how to optimally
align gene sequences
sequences under possible mutations. It is interesting to note that two popular scoring matrices used in
gene sequence alignment, i.e., PAM [18]
[ I 81 and BLOSSOM [18],
[18], have been constantly evolved (and are still
still evolving)

to reflect newly-discovered mutations for decades. Similarly, considering the scoring matrix behind our algorithm is
primitive as it simply returns 1I if two flows
flows are fully matched, additional efforts are still necessary to refine the scoring
matrix. Fortunately, our application domain is different from the original biological domain as a worm usually can
not evolve itself at runtime and has relatively limited number of possible substitutions. In addition, a worm capable
of substituting its infection steps is likely to be more bloated (e.g.,
(e.g., reflected by its replica size) than a compact one.
An over-bloated worm is more likely to be detected in the first place.

Behavior-camouflaging
Behavior-camouflagingattacks Behavioral footprinting is designed to capture a worm's infection steps exposed
during its infection. A worm author might attempt to inject fake
fake steps into the infection sequences.
sequences. After these fake
fake
steps have been included in the worm's behavioral footprint,
footprint, the worm will stop exhibiting these fake
fake steps. As a

result, the behavioral footprint will experience a sudden increase in false negatives because a full match against the
footprint will fail
fail from now on.
on. The fundamental solution is to identify
identify and remove those fake steps using techniques
such as semantic-level analysis [34,44],
[34,44], which is an on-going,
on-going, challenging research topic. Another possible approach
is to mitigate such attack by adopting partial instead of full
full footprint matching. However,
However, a trade-off will be made

to determine the confidence level of the partial matching to avoid the opposite, namely high false
false positives. Other
dimensions (e.g.,
(e.g., content fingerprinting) may provide complementary capability in this case.
case.

6

Related work
Due to the significant threat imposed by self-propagating worms, security researchers have explored various di-

mensions to first capture worms' uniqueness and then apply them for worm identification.
Among the most notable, content fingerprinting [26,
[26, 28, 33, 43]
431 has been widely examined and utilized to derive

the most representative content sequences. Realizing the inconvenience in manually extract the content sequences,
sequences,
several
[28], Autograph [26],
[26], EarlyBird [43]
[43] and Polygraph [33]
[33] have been recently proseveral systems such as Honeycomb [28],
process. However,
posed to automate the content-based signature extraction process.
However, a content sequence is only able to detect
the worm activity within one infection step or most likely,
1). Behavioral footprintfootprintlikely, the exploitation stage (Figure 1).
ing instead is proposed to capture worms' uniqueness during its entire infection session, which nicely complements
content fingerprinting (Section 4.3).
Another dimension,
dimension, anomaly detection [1,
[ l , 2, 3, 24, 29, 39, 48],
481, leverages
leverages the insight that worms are likely to
generate anomalous behaviors such as port scanning [24]
[24] and failed connection attempts [1,2,3],
[ l , 2, 31, which are different
from the normal behavior. Though such approach has been demonstrated effective in detecting worm infection, it is
22

worms. In other words, it mainly answers the question "is there a worm infection?", not the
not intended to identify
idenrfi worms.
question "which worm is this?".
Other promising dimensions include vulnerability-specific characterization [I,
[ I , 32, 47]
471 and semantic-aware taintedness tracking [14,15,34,40,44].
[14, 15, 34, 40, 441. Shield [47]
[47] or similarly Worm Vaccine [I]
[I] and Generic Exploit Blocking [32]
[32]

propose the notion of vulnerability-specific signature and use it to accurately filter out attack flows.
flows. TaintCheck
Taintcheck [34],
[34],
Minos [15],
[14], and other related systems [40,44]
[40,44] enable the detection of unknown attacks by associating
[15], Vigilante [14],
a tag to untrusted information sources and reporting an alert if a tainted instruction is executed. These schemes are
generally applicable even to detect unknown attacks or intrusions. While capable of detecting the occurrence of a

possible exploitation,
exploitation, they do not attempt to characterize the entire worm infection process where exploitation is only
one of the infection phases.
Different from these dimensions, behavioral
behavioral footprinting is a new but complementary dimension.
dimension. Recently, another
related behavior-oriented approach [19]
1191 is proposed. However,
However, it focuses
focuses on the inter-machine propagation pattern
(tree) exhibited by worms as well as the similar payload from one machine to another.
another. Moreover, it implicitly assumes
justifying the existence and proposing the extraction of worm
the existence of worms' behavioral footprints, without justifying

behavioral footprints,
footprints, which is the focus
focus of our work.

7

Conclusion
We have presented a new promising dimension, behavioral footprinting,
footprinting, to enrich the worm characterization space.

Orthogonal and complementary to existing dimensions,
dimensions, behavioral footprinting characterizes the temporal worm
infection process. Efficient and robust algorithms are proposed to accurately and reliably extract worm behavioral
footprints.
footprints. Our experiments with real-world worms, in comparison with the content-based fingerprinting approach,
clearly demonstrate the feasibility,
feasibility, uniqueness, and robustness of behavioral footprinting.
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